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THE POWER OF THE PARENTAL TRUMP CARD:
HOW AND WHY FRAZIER V. WINN GOT IT RIGHT
JOCELYN FLOYD*
INTRODUCTION
Unlike men, not all rights are created equal. Since the advent of sub-
stantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
has recognized certain rights as "fundamental" and thus worthy of higher
protection. 1 When two fundamental rights are in conflict, however, such
that the protection of one requires the infringement of the other, the ques-
tion remains as to which right ultimately trumps. The problem is further
compounded when the specific situation places the rights of parents in con-
flict with the rights of their children.
On July 23, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit dealt with such a question in Frazier v. Winn.2 In that case, the
court appropriately affirmed that children's right to free speech is only as
expansive as their parents allow, justified by the parents' fundamental right
to rear their children as they see fit.3 The conflict arose when Cameron
Frazier, a high school junior, challenged the constitutionality of a Florida
statute that required him to get parental permission in order to be excused
from reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in school.4 Recognizing that com-
pelled speech violates the First Amendment as much as censorship does,
the court acknowledged that the State, acting on its own, had no right to
* J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Notes and Comments Editor, Chi-
cago-Kent Law Review. The author would like to thank Professor Steven Heyman for his invaluable
help in developing this paperl; Maribel Nash for her research powess; Amanda Stevens, Mars Mapol-
ski, and Rue Toland for their editing skills; and her family and friends for tolerating innumerable dis-
cussions as she honed her thesis.
1. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-720 (1997) (stating "The Due Process
Clause... provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental
rights and liberty interests" and tracing the historical judicial recognition of those fundamental rights).
2. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2008), en bane denied, 555 F.3d 1292
(11 th Cir. Jan. 26, 2009), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 69 (Oct. 5, 2009).
3. Frazier, 535 F.3d at 1285-86.
4. Id. at 1281. The case also dealt with another portion of the statute requiring all students to
stand during the Pledge, even if excused from saying it. Id. at 1282. The court agreed with the plaintiff
on that front and found that severing that portion of the statute removed the constitutional problem
without undermining the statute as a whole. Id. at 1283.
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force students to recite the Pledge. 5 It went on, however, to demonstrate
how this case did not present solely an instance of State versus student in a
free speech dispute. 6 Rather, it was a situation in which child and parent
were at odds, where any action by the State to protect the rights of one
necessarily infringed on the rights of the other. 7 In this case, the court ruled
that the State must stand with the parent. 8
In 1943, in the case West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, the United States Supreme Court clearly held that compelled
affirmation of a belief in school violates the First Amendment.9 The Florida
statute in Frazier acted in accordance with that precedent, though, by both
offering a means of refusal and requiring that all students explicitly be noti-
fied of that means. 10 As the means required students to get parental permis-
sion to be excused, the question shifts from First Amendment rights and the
State to an intra-family conflict between the student and his parents. 1
Children and parents 12 have a unique relationship with respect to per-
sonal rights. On the one hand, decisions such as Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion of Topeka established that children are persons in possession of
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. 13 Later decisions explic-
itly included the right of free speech. 14 However, unlike those of any adult,
the rights of children are always defined in relation to their parents, 15 and
parents have an affirmative right and duty to direct the upbringing and edu-
cation of their children. 16 In part, this right "rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions." 17 The parents'
duty similarly rests on their role of preparing the child for the obligations of
5. Id. at 1284-85 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
6. Id. at 1284.
7. Id. at 1284-85.
8. Id. at 1285.
9. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
10. FLA. STAT. § 1003.44(1) (2007). Specifically, the statute states, "Each student shall be in-
formed by posting a notice in a conspicuous place that the student has the right not to participate in
reciting the pledge."
11. § 1003.44(1). The statute states, "Upon written request by his or her parent, the student must
be excused from reciting the pledge." Id.
12. As used in this note, the term "parents" includes parents and guardians-whoever is charged
with legal guardianship over the student. The issue of who bears the right of parenthood, through genet-
ics, adoption, or other means, is outside the scope of this note.
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
15. Theresa Glennon & Robert G. Schwartz, Foreword: Looking Back Looking Ahead: The
Evolution of Children's Rights, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1557, 1562 (1995).
16. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
17. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
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adulthood. 18
The situation in Frazier elicits two separate concerns: (1) whether the
state of Florida, having implemented a policy of Pledge of Allegiance reci-
tation in schools, may constitutionally offer a right of refusal only to the
parent; and, if so, (2) whether the state should choose such a policy. This
note will focus primarily on the first question, as a legal matter. The merits
of education by rote memorization and recitation as compared to discussion
are certainly worthy of analysis, both by states and by parents. In the case
of Frazier, however, the choice has already been made in favor of recita-
tion, which shifts the question to the validity of the choice to give only the
parent the right to opt out of that recitation. The goal of this note is to cre-
ate not uniform agreement with that choice, but rather respect for the legal
right of Florida to have made it. Additionally, while the situation implicates
questions of free speech, this note will focus not on the rights of children
against the State, but rather on the relationship between the rights of chil-
dren and of their parents, -as well as what role the State has between them.
This note will analyze various precedents regarding both freedom of
speech and parents' fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren. Ultimately, those precedents can, and should, be read to support the
parental right in Frazier. The analysis consists of four parts. The first two
parts consist of legal analysis, with Part I presenting a summary of Su-
preme Court precedent regarding both children's and parents' rights and
Part II applying that precedent to Frazier. The next two parts will look
beyond the legal framework of the question at hand, with Part III showing
historical precedent for choosing to support parental rights and Part IV
presenting modern philosophical support for parental rights.
I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
At first glance, it would seem that only one precedent would be neces-
sary to decide Frazier in favor of the student: Barnette, in which the Su-
preme Court held that the State could not constitutionally compel recitation
of the Pledge of Allegiance in schools. 19 But, if there were any doubt that
the student, as an individual, had the right to free speech in the context of a
school, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District20
would again seem to settle the question firmly in favor of the student in
Frazier. However, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser21 and Vernonia
18. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
19. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
20. 393 U.S. 503 (students have free speech rights in school).
21. 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (allowing local school board to determine limits on vulgarity in class-
2010]
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School District 47J v. Acton 22 show that minor students' constitutional
rights do not extend as far as those of adults and are limited to what is ap-
propriate for children in the school context.23
Additionally, because the conflict in Frazier is between the student
and his parent, the Supreme Court's precedent regarding parental rights is
equally pertinent to the discussion. Cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska24 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters25 established parents' fundamental right to "di-
rect the upbringing and education" of their children. 26 Furthermore, Prince
v. Massachusetts dealt with the extent of that right, and the ability of the
State to intervene under the theory of parens patriae,27 while Wisconsin v.
Yoder illustrated some of the limitations on the State's parens patriae
power.28 Finally, Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow demon-
strated a shift from earlier cases in that divorced parents disagreed with
each other, and only one disagreed with the State.29 Notably, the Court
ruled in favor of the custodial parent's view, with which the child agreed,
and the case still offered no rule for situations in which child is pitted
against parent.30
A. Freedom of Speech for Students
1. Barnette: Compelled speech violates the First Amendment
Barnette is the seminal case regarding forced Pledge of Allegiance
recitation 31 and thus the one on which Frazier relied heavily to support his
case.32 Barnette was decided just three years after the Supreme Court de-
clared, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, that a compulsory Pledge
was perfectly legitimate. 33 In both cases, the dispute arose in the context of
religious freedom, with Jehovah's Witnesses refusing to recite the Pledge
room and school assemblies). To avoid potential confusion between Fraser and Frazier, Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser will be abbreviated as Bethel throughout this note.
22. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
23. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at
506).
24. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
25. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
26. Id. at 534.
27. 321 U.S. 158. 166(1944).
28. 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
29. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
30. Id. at 9, 17-18.
31. 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
32. See generally Answer Brief of Appellee, Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (11 th
Cir. 2008) (No. 06-14462-FF).
33. 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940).
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for religious reasons. 34 Only in the Supreme Court's opinion did the focus
shift to the issue of free speech. 35
After Gobitis, West Virginia enacted legislation requiring instruction
in history, civics, and the Constitution for purposes of "teaching, fostering
and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism .... ,,36
To further that goal, the Board of Education required that a salute to the
flag become "a regular part of the program of activities in the public
schools. '37 The punishment for "insubordinate" refusal was expulsion. 38
Parents, too, shared in the punishment by extension, as they were subject to
fines and imprisonment for their children's truancy. 39
Members of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith, however, regarded the flag
as a "graven image" forbidden by the Second Commandment.40 As such,
saluting and pledging allegiance to it went against their religious faith, and
they refused to allow their children to participate. 41 In an effort to compro-
mise, the Witnesses offered a substitute pledge in line with their faith.42
They were not the only group to protest.43 The Parent and Teachers Asso-
ciation, the Boy and Girl Scouts, the Red Cross, and the Federation of
Women's Clubs all objected to the required physical salute, claiming it was
too much like that of the Nazis-an important concern in the midst of
World War 11.44 While the Board made some modifications to the physical
salute in response to those objections, it made no concession for the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses. 45
Religion formed the original framework for the dispute, but the Su-
preme Court's decision was unconcerned with the religious beliefs of the
challengers. 46 Rather, the obligation to salute the flag and recite the Pledge
required "affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. '47 When compul-
sory, this affirmation infringed on the freedom of speech of those who dis-
34. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629; Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591-92.
35. Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES
433, 448 (Michael C. Doffed., 2004).
36. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625.
37. Id. at 626.
38. Id. at 629.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 628 n.4.
43. Id. at 627-28.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 628.
46. Id. at 634.
47. Id. at 633.
2010]
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agreed, regardless of whether the speaker bore directly conflicting religious
views or simply did not wish to affirm the belief as stated.48 The Court
reaffirmed that freedom of speech is "susceptible of restriction only to pre-
vent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully
protect," and that national unity, while permissible through persuasion and
example, was not an interest which the State could lawfully promote
through compulsion.49
2. Tinker, Bethel, and Acton: Students' Constitutional Rights in School
Barnette dealt with the fundamental right of free speech in the specific
context of the Pledge of Allegiance in school. Other cases show the extent
to which students possess fundamental rights in that same school setting.
When a fundamental, individual right conflicts with the school's duty to
provide education, the student's fundamental right is often more restricted
than that of an adult. In Tinker50 and Bethel,51 the Court articulated some
boundaries of that scope regarding free speech. In Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton, the issue was not free speech, but the Court again addressed
the scope of a student's rights.52
The events leading to Tinker began in 1965, when a group of both
adults and children wanted to protest the Vietnam War visibly.53 They de-
cided to fast and wear black armbands through the holiday season. 54 Three
of the children, high-schoolers John Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt, and
John's junior-high sister, Mary Beth, decided to join their parents in this
protest.55 The form of the protest resembled those in which they had all
participated before. 56 In response to the plan, their school principals created
a new policy to suspend any student who refused to remove the armband. 57
The district court ruled the policy acceptable because it was based on
"fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands," and therefore
corresponded to other rules within the school's authority. 58 The Supreme
Court, however, distinguished the regulation of the armbands from legiti-
48. Id. at 634-35.
49. Id. at 639-40, 642.
50. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
51. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
52. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
53. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 508.
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mate restrictions on skirt length, hair style, and cosmetics, 59 classifying the
armbands as political expression rather than mere fashion. 60 Further, as
political speech, the armbands did not involve "aggressive, disruptive ac-
tion" or a legitimate fear of such things. 61 As a result, the school had no
superior interest to allow infringement on the "direct, primary First
Amendment rights."'62
Bethel, by contrast, presents a situation in which the school does have
the right to limit the speech of its students. 63 Matthew Fraser made a
speech at a school assembly, attended by high school students as young as
fourteen. 64 He nominated a fellow student for student office in "elaborate,
graphic, and explicit sexual" terms. 65 In accordance with a school policy
regarding obscene language, he was suspended for three days. 66 Fraser
sued for violation of his free speech rights.67
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided in his favor, hold-
ing his speech "indistinguishable from the ... armband[s] in Tinker...-68
The Supreme Court reversed, however, because of the "marked distinction"
between the non-disruptive political protest of the armbands and the sexual
content of Fraser's speech. 69 Through this difference, the Court created a
separate category of student speech from the original Tinker standard,
which offered protection for all student speech so long as it did not "in-
trude[] upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students."'70
In its opinion, the Court declared that the purpose of the American
school system was the "inculcation of fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system."' 71 It recognized that the
constitutional "freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervail-
ing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate be-
havior."'72 The Court recognized the "inculcation of these values" to be a
59. Id. at 507-08 (citing Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Pugsley
v. Sellmeyer, 250 S.W. 538 (Ark. 1923)).
60. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
64. Id. at 677.
65. Id. at 677-78.
66. Id. at 678.
67. Id. at 679.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 680.
70. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
71. Id. at 681 (citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
72. Id.
2010]
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vital component of education, with teachers and older students modeling
"the shared values of a civilized social order" through their conduct both in
and out of class. 73 In that regard, the Court held that the proper determina-
tion of appropriate manner of speech-both for the classroom setting and
for the broader school assembly-rests with the local school board.74
Acton, while not dealing with free speech, still addressed the extent of
students' constitutional rights within the context of public schools. 75 An
Oregon school district noticed an increased level of both drug usage and
disciplinary problems among its student body, especially among athletes.76
After receiving unanimous approval at a parent input night, the school
board approved a drug-testing program to combat the trend.77 Part of the
program required all student athletes and their parents to sign a form con-
senting to uniform drug testing at the start of the year and weekly drawings
throughout the season to select random students for re-testing. 78 Seventh-
grader James Acton and his parents refused to sign the form, which barred
him from participating in sports. 79 He then sued the school district, claim-
ing that the program violated the Fourth Amendment. 80
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government, which includes urine tests as a
"search" and school officials as representatives of the government. 81 Nor-
mally, a search is reasonable if the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests outweighs the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
privacy interests. 82 In any law enforcement context, proof of that balance
typically requires a warrant. 83 The Court held here, however, that the
school context has special needs which take precedence over the need for a
warrant; namely, "the substantial need of teachers and administrators for
freedom to maintain order in the schools." 84
The Court justified its decision by looking both at the rights of chil-
dren vis-A-vis their parents, and at the role of the school officials standing
in loco parentis.85 First, with regard to children and parents, the Court said,
73. Id. at 683.
74. Id.
75. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
76. Id. at 648-49.
77. Id. at 649-50.
78. Id. at 650.
79. Id. at 651.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 652.
82. Id. at 652-53.
83. Id. at 653.
84. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).
85. Id. at 654.
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"[t]raditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack
some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination. ' 86 Even with
the most basic of freedoms, the "liberty" right to physically come and go,
minors "are subject ... to the control of their parents or guardians. '87
The school then shares in that control through the doctrine of in loco
parentis.88 The parent delegates part of his parental authority to place the
school in loco parentis, and then the school "has such a portion of the
power of the parent committed to his charge, [namely] that of restraint and
correction." 89 Here the Court relied on Bethel to support the proposition
that in loco parentis confers the power and duty to "inculcate the habits and
manners of civility."90 However, the school does not share the lack of con-
stitutional limitations on parental power, in part because compulsory edu-
cation laws remove the parent's choice to grant authority voluntarily.91
Nonetheless, while the Court cited Tinker's proposition that children do not
shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, they remain distinct
from ones outside the school context, with "the nature of those rights [be-
ing] what is appropriate for children in school." 92
B. Parental Right to Direct Upbringing
1. Meyer and Pierce: Official Recognition of the parental right
Meyer v. Nebraska93 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters94 set the founda-
tion for the notion of parental rights in modem Supreme Court precedent.
Meyer, decided in 1923, recognized educational choices as a "liberty" pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 95 while Pierce affirmed the right to
be free from excessive interference without a legitimate state purpose. 96
In Meyer, Nebraska's legislature had banned any classes in any lan-
guage other than English with the goal of promoting the common language
of English among all its citizens, which included large numbers of immi-
grants. 97 The purpose behind the legislation was to "promote civic devel-
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 655 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 441 (1769)).
90. Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).
91. Id. at 655.
92. Id. at 655-56 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
93. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
94. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
95. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
96. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
97. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01.
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opment" by ensuring that young people learned English and American
ideals, and the Court recognized that the State may do a great deal "in order
to improve the quality of its citizens. ' 98 However, the State's actions in
pursuit of that goal may not infringe on the basic fundamental rights those
citizens possess.99 As a result, the Court overturned Nebraska's policy be-
cause it interfered both with the ability of the children to learn, and with the
power of the parents to control their children's education. 100 While the
Court protected both the children and parents, it explicitly articulated only
the parental right to rear children as a fundamental liberty right protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 101
Two years later, the Court followed Meyer with Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, where it again prevented the State from excessively interfering with
parental educational choices. 102 It articulated the right of parents as the
right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol."10 3 In Pierce, Oregon had adopted a statute requiring all children of
specified ages, with certain restrictions for handicapped children and other
exceptions, to attend public schools. 104 The practical effect of the statute
was to shut down private schools by forcing patrons to "choose" the public
school. 105 The Society of Sisters, which ran private schools, brought suit to
protect its business from that effect. 106 The extended effect, however, and
the one with stronger constitutional implications, was that the statute re-
moved education choices from the hands of the parents. 107 According to the
Court, the Constitution guarantees the parents' right to that choice, and
legislation may not abridge it unless the abridgement is justified by a le-
gitimate state purpose. 108 While creating high-quality future citizens
through education could be a legitimate and laudable state goal, as estab-
lished in Meyer,109 it did not extend to allow the State to force all education
to come from state-run schools. 110
2. Prince, Yoder, and Newdow: Further Development Regarding Parental
98. Id. at 401.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 400-03.
101. Id. at 399.
102. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (1925).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 530-31.
105. Id. at 531-32.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 534-35.
108. Id. at 535.
109. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
110. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
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Rights
Prince v. Massachusetts, decided shortly after Barnette, delineated
some of the outer boundaries past which the parental right could not ex-
tend."' Rather than the educational setting, Prince dealt with a mother's
religious choice regarding her child, having the child preach and sell Jeho-
vah's Witnesses magazines on a public intersection.1 12 However, in addi-
tion to being a religious choice, this also violated state child labor laws by
essentially employing her child as a salesperson in a public place.113
The Court again recognized the cardinal role of parents in the "cus-
tody, care, and nurture of the child." ' 1 4 It also acknowledged parents' right
to raise their children according to the doctrine of a specific religion, as
parents have the primary obligation to prepare children for adulthood in
ways that "the state can neither supply nor hinder." 115 However, while
religious choices were a valid exercise of parental authority, the effect of
those choices showed a limitation on that authority."l 6 Specifically, the
state could act as parens patriae to guard "the general interest in youth's
well being," through regulation of child labor, school attendance require-
ments, and other similar restrictions. 1 7 When the state acted in the public
interest, even the parental right could not supersede child labor laws.' 18
Parens patriae literally means "parent of [the] country" and is the
power of the "state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable
to care for themselves." ' 19 Much more expansive than the doctrine of in
loco parentis, under which one acts in the place of a parent or guardian
when the parent has specifically handed over the responsibility of care, 120
parens patriae nonetheless requires the State to show that its action is
"necessary for or conducive to the child's protection against some clear and
present danger" in order to impinge upon the superior right of the parent. 12 1
In the case of Prince, the "crippling effects of child employment" proved to
111. 321 U.S. 158(1944).
112. Id. at 161-63.
113. Id. at 159.
114. Id. at 166.
115. Id. at 165-66.
116. Id. at 166.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004). The doctrine of parens patriae and how it
compares to in loco parentis ("in the place of a parent" / Of, relating to, or acting as a temporary guard-
ian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent) is discussed by Tara
Dahl in Surveys in America's Classrooms: How Much Do Parents Really Know?, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 143
(2008).
120. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004).
121. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944).
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be a sufficiently clear and present danger to justify the State's action under
parens patriae. 122
By contrast, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,123 even the State's repeatedly rec-
ognized interest in universal education was balanced against the traditional
interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their chil-
dren. 124 At the time of the case, Wisconsin law required school attendance
until the student reached the age of sixteen. 125 Amish families testified at
trial that the values taught in high school, both public and private, went
against the values of both the Amish religion and the Amish way of life. 126
According to their beliefs, the values that further public education would
impose on their children bore the risk of endangering their salvation. 127
They argued that adolescence was a crucially formative period and that
modem high schools were not equipped to pass on the values specific to the
Amish community. 128 Further, forcing Amish teenagers to be separated
from those values during that period prevented them from preparing to
accept the role that came with adult baptism. 129
In contrast, the State argued that its role as parens patriae both al-
lowed and required it to offer secondary education to all its citizens, regard-
less of the parents' wishes. 130 The State claimed that if a child chose to
leave the Amish community, the lack of secondary education would leave
him ill-prepared to face adulthood in modem society.131
The Court was not persuaded by the State's argument, instead stating
that government regulation of such protected liberties must be directed
against harm to "the physical or mental health of the child or to the public
safety, peace, order, or welfare. ' 132 Specific factual evidence supported the
distinct lack of such harm. 133 First, Amish communities experienced very
little attrition. 134 Second, even if a member wished to leave, the Amish
training included enough "vocational" education to prepare for adulthood
in modem society. 135
122. Id. at 168.
123. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
124. Id. at 214.
125. Id. at 207.
126. Id. at209.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 211-12.
129. Id. at 211.
130. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229 (1972).
131. Id. at224.
132. Id. at 230.
133. Id. at 224.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow is a recent case involv-
ing both parental rights and a Pledge of Allegiance statute. 136 It is also the
first in this line of cases to show a conflict between the wishes of the child
and those of the parent.' 37 In Newdow, the Court focused on whether a non-
custodial father had the proper standing to sue regarding his child's educa-
tion.138 The father, an atheist, took issue with his daughter reciting the
Pledge in school, expressing religious objection to the inclusion of the
phrase "under God."'139 Neither the daughter nor the mother had any objec-
tion to the recitation of the Pledge as it stood. 140 The Court acknowledged
that the interests of the challenging parent and the child were not parallel,
and were "indeed,[] potentially in conflict."' 141
However, the Court did not have to rule on whose right would prevail
between parent and child in conflict, because the mother and daughter were
in agreement with each other. 142 As part of the couple's divorce proceed-
ings, the mother had received court-endorsed authority regarding child-
rearing decisions where she and the father were in disagreement. 143 There-
fore, the Court ruled that the father did not even have standing to sue re-
garding his daughter's education. 144 This does not mean that the father's
rights were trumped by those of the child, but that the parental right to
overrule the child's wishes was among the rights of which he had been
deprived by the original custody order. 145 The Court's need to focus on the
father's standing also implicitly supports the power of this parental right,
because the Court gave no credence to, nor so much as mentioned the pos-
sibility of, a child's right to free speech within the school having the power
to trump the wishes of her parent. 146
136. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 14-15.
139. Id. at 5.
140. Id. at 9.
141. Id. at 15.
142. Id. at 9.
143. Id. at 14.
144. Id. at 17.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 15.
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II. APPLYING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT TO FRAZIER V. WINN
The common thread among all the precedential cases listed, supra,
barring in part Newdow, was that the students and the parents were in
agreement, or at least not in vocal disagreement, regarding the choices
made. The precedent for the student's individual, fundamental rights within
the school context is generally in favor of the student over the State, as
shown in Tinker. Importantly, though, the extent of a student's constitu-
tional rights can be smaller than that of an adult's, as evidenced by Bethel
and Acton. Similarly, parents prevail against the State in general educa-
tional choices, as in Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder, but they do not trump the
State when they act against the general public interest, as in Prince. How-
ever, this same precedent has offered very little on the question of whether
the outcome would be the same were the parents to disagree with the stu-
dent.
This note does not dispute that when the family is united in support of
those choices, the State must typically bow to the shared fundamental
rights of the family, and therefore also to the rights of the individual within.
It is the application of this precedent to a family in conflict with itself,
however, that Frazier requires. 147 This section will show how the precedent
can be read to support the proposition that when the child and parent are in
conflict, and the State's only course of action is to support one's rights at
the cost of the other's, the State should stand with the parents. None of the
cases require the school to place the choice of whether the student shall
recite the Pledge of Allegiance solely with the parents. But neither do any
of them forbid it, should the State choose that statutory scheme.
A. The Frazier Statute in Light of Students' Rights in School
On its face, Barnette seems the most analogous in fact pattern to Fra-
zier, and thus appears to have the clearest application of precedent. Both
involve a school requiring students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, both
have a student refusing, and both offer punishments for the student. How-
ever, there the similarities end. The requirement in Barnette offered no
exceptions, 148 while the statute in Frazier not only has an opt-out provi-
sion, but also requires that all students be notified of it. 149 The students in
Barnette bore the initial punishment for refusing to recite the Pledge, but
their parents bore the ultimate responsibility for the children's actions,
147. Frazier, 535 F.3d at 1279.
148. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629.
149. Frazier, 535 F.3d at 1281.
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including criminal penalties. 150 Under the Frazier facts, any student who
refused to say the Pledge either did it legitimately, with his parents' per-
mission, or against the wishes of his parents, thus bringing any penalty
upon himself alone. 151
The greatest difference between Barnette and Frazier, however, is the
number of actors involved. Barnette involved only two: the State and the
families. 152 Frazier, by contrast, expands to three: the State, the parents,
and the students.153 The Court in Barnette stated that the "freedom asserted
by these appellees does not bring them into collision with rights asserted by
any other individual."'154 Indeed, the case stood out from typical cases re-
quiring State intervention, because there was no determination necessary of
"where the rights of one end and those of another begin."' 155
Frazier stands in marked contrast to Barnette because Cameron Fra-
zier rested his entire case on the fact that the Florida statute infringed upon
his rights and his alone. 156 The statute in question satisfies the required
standard set forth in Barnette by offering a means of refusal. 157 Frazier's
contention-that the means of refusal are not sufficient-presents a signifi-
cant deviation from the Barnette fact pattern by introducing a third party.
This changes the necessary analysis to one where "determination of where
the rights of one end and those of another begin" is vital to the conclusion.
After all, if the student and his parents were of one accord, no conflict
would remain. The speech would neither be compelled nor forbidden, but
rather independently chosen or not chosen, thus removing the issue of free
speech infringement altogether.
Additionally, while the assumption of parental preference for recita-
tion makes a situation of compelled speech more likely, the Court read the
statute to also implicate the reverse: if a parent sent in a written request for
the child to be excused from the Pledge, the school must forbid the child to
say it. 158 This lengthens the distance from Barnette in that it shifts the ques-
tion from solely a compelled speech issue to one of speech in general. That
issue then becomes one of how much control the parents should have over
the speech of their child-in general, in the school, and in using the State
as a tool for that control.
150. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629.
151. Frazier, 535 F.3dat 1283.
152. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630.
153. Frazier, 535 F.3dat 1284-85.
154. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630.
155. Id.
156. Frazier, 535 F.3dat 1281.
157. Id. at 1283.
158. Id. at 1285.
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Even without that final step to the paradigm of an active parental right
subordinating the child's rights, the ideology regarding children's individ-
ual rights allows the interpretation of the Frazier statute as satisfying the
demands of Barnette. As the Court re-emphasized in 1995, a minor's rights
of self-determination, of which speech is surely one, remain at the control
of his parents. 159 With that framework in place, the choice by the school
board to place the right of refusal solely in the hands of the parents is not
an illegitimate one. Though the school board in Acton chose to require
consent from both the student and the parents, nothing in the Court's deci-
sion indicates that the program would have failed had the consent only
been required of the parents. 160 Indeed, the Court relied on Bethel and
Tinker to reiterate that in loco parentis confers the power to "inculcate
habits and manners of civility," and further emphasized that students' con-
stitutional rights within an educational context are limited to a nature ap-
propriate to the situation. 161 This reasoning would seem to indicate that a
choice to give the ultimate decision-making power to the parents would not
be held unconstitutional.
B. The Frazier Statute in Light of Parental Rights
Viewing the Frazier statute in light of a student's rights alone admit-
tedly allows more room for interpretation regarding the outcome. A stu-
dent's constitutional rights within school are more limited, as is appropriate
for a minor in the context of an institution of learning, but that does not
necessarily prevent him from exercising self-determination regarding an
affirmation of belief such as the Pledge of Allegiance. The question, how-
ever, is not one of his rights alone. The additional parental factor here, as
one that protects and encourages both the parental right and the parental
duty of directing the upbringing of their children, shifts the balance further
in favor of affirming the Frazier decision.
The question is not whether the State must, but rather whether the
State may implement a statutory scheme such as the one in Frazier. The
precedent set by Meyer and Pierce prevents the State from excessively
interfering in the educational choices of a parent without a legitimate State
purpose. 162 Similarly, while the State needs a legitimate purpose to infringe
upon a student's constitutional rights in the educational setting, 163 the court
159. Acton, 515 U.S. at 654.
160. Id. at 650.
161. Id. at 655-56 (quoting Bethel, 478 U.S. at 684).
162. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (1925).
163. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653; Bethel, 478 U.S. at 680.
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has recognized certain educational standards as sufficient purposes. 164
Since the parental right is predicated on the parents' role in the upbringing,
including education, of their children, 165 it too could be viewed as falling
into this educational need to limit the student's personal constitutional
rights.
This is not to say that the parental right requires the State, any more
than the student cases listed above, to enact the type of statute that Florida
chose in Frazier. However, in light of the parental right and the legitimate
State purpose in supporting that right, the State should remain free to
choose such a course.
After Meyer and Pierce, Prince clarified that the parental right was
not absolute. 166 Even so, while the State may act in opposition to the parent
under the notion of parens patriae, that action must still only be to protect
the child "against some clear and present danger."'1 67 Despite Prince's vio-
lation of child labor laws in that circumstance, parents' choices regarding
education, instilling loyalty to one's country, or inculcating the habits of
civility rarely reach into the realm of posing a clear and present danger to
their children.
Indeed, the Court in Yoder, in dealing with a compulsory education
law of the type deemed justifiable under parens patriae in Prince, found
that even legitimate exercise of parens patriae could be limited by the pa-
rental right. 168 As with the majority of the cases seen here, the Court con-
sidered the desires of the parents and children together. 169 Though the state
was acting under parens patriae in favor of children and its own interests in
quality future citizens, it argued its right to enforce compulsory attendance
on Amish parents the same as on other parents, as the punishment for dis-
obedience was borne by the parents, not the children. 170 The Court there-
fore viewed the matter entirely in the context of the parental rights.' 71
While it refused to consider the situation in which the child and parent
were in conflict over the exercise of religious and educational rights, as it
was not at issue there, the Court did explicitly state that "such a proceeding
would, of course, call into question traditional concepts of parental control
over the religious upbringing and education of their minor children recog-
164. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653; Bethel, 478 U.S. at 680 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Crnty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
165. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
166. Prince. 321 U.S. at 158.
167. Id. at 167.
168. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231.
169. Id.
170. Id. at230-31.
171. Id.
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nized in this Court's past decisions."' 172 Further, the tone of the entire opin-
ion respected the parental concern of maintaining the Amish way of life
through raising children in accordance with Amish values. 173 Taken in
combination with the tone, this statement offered no indication that the
Court would give the child's contrary desire much, if any, weight were the
child and parent to be at odds with each other. 174 Rather, the parents' duties
toward the child "must be read to include the inculcation of moral stan-
dards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."' 175 The Court
offered limits on such inculcation only if the parent's decisions "jeopard-
ize[d] the health or safety of the child, or [had] a potential for significant
social burdens."1 76
More recently, the Court in Newdow came closest to the issue of par-
ent and child in conflict, though still without taking a clear stance on that
issue. 177 While the father's interest and that of his child were in conflict,
the Court's decision did not rest on that fact. 178 Rather, the father's free-
dom to direct his child's upbringing was limited there because he had been
deprived of that right through a court's custody order.179 The need for the
Court to decide the father's standing at all implicitly supports the power of
parents' rights, because if the child's right had the power to trump that of
her father, his custodial standing would have been of no import.180
Further, though the father in Newdow was limited in his control of the
State regarding his daughter, the Court acknowledged that a "next friend"
could "reach outside the private parent-child sphere" to control a third
party-that is, the State. 18 1 While a next friend would be limited to a parent
with custodial rights, the associated full extent of parental rights further
lends credence to the argument in Frazier that the State was legitimately
acting at the behest of parents.
These cases lend support to the court's decision in Frazier to favor the
parental right to compel speech in directing the upbringing of one's chil-
dren. The line of cases limiting the State's ability to infringe on a student's
constitutional rights all placed such limits in situations where the student
and parents were in a unified stance, and equally established the State's
172. Id. at 231.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 233.
176. Id. at 233-34.
177. Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15 (2004),
178. Id. at 15-16.
179. Id. at 17.
180. Id. at 1.
181. Id. at 17.
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ability to infringe in furtherance of a legitimate State interest. The parental-
right line establishes a fundamental right worthy of State protection. It also
establishes the inference that when parents and minor children are in con-
flict over parenting choices, the State should support the parent's childrear-
ing choices absent a "clear and present danger" to the child. In other words,
absent a clear harm to a child, that child possesses self-determination rights
with respect to the State only to the extent the parent wishes.
The fact that the parental choice in Frazier involved recitation of the
Pledge does not meet the threshold of clear and present danger. While
modem educators debate the validity of rote recitation in learning, there is
still evidence to support the idea that it can be highly effective. 182 More-
over, recitation of a belief without true adherence to it can also lead to fa-
miliarity, self-analysis, and an ultimate shift to that true adherence. 183 As
such, it is both a legitimate educational and parental choice, as well as far
from a danger.
The power given to the school through in loco parentis, while not giv-
ing the school complete immunity to constitutional concerns, does give the
school the ability to make choices in furtherance of education that would be
forbidden if implemented against adults. Thus, while national unity is not
an interest which the State may lawfully protect through compulsion, 184
parental educational choices could fall into a category enabling compelled
speech.
Again, the question in Frazier is whether it is permissible, at the re-
quest of the citizenry and through the democratic process, to create a statute
which sets certain educational standards while simultaneously offering an
out for dissenters. The State could implement a scheme that allows either
student or parent to make the choice, and some states have. 185 Similarly,
instead of presuming that silent parents wished their children to recite the
Pledge, the State could implement a scheme requiring an affirmative state-
ment, to recite or to refrain, from each student's parents. However, while
those schemes are certainly acceptable, neither is required of the State, and
their availability does not serve to undermine the scheme chosen by Florida
in Frazier. In fact, the prevalence of other state and federal statutes, both in
182. See, e.g., Carol Muske-Dukes, A Lost Eloquence 27 Am. Educ. 42, 42-3 (2003) (discussing
advantages of rote memorization of poetry).
183. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 35, at 461.
184. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639-40.
185. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 33-1602(5) (2008) ("No pupil shall be compelled, against the pupil's
objections or those of the pupil's parent or guardian, to recite the pledge of allegiance or to sing the
national anthem."); Bums Ind. Code Ann. § 20-20-5-0.5 (2008) ("A student is exempt from participa-
tion in the Pledge of Allegiance... if: (1) the student chooses not to participate; or (2) the student's
parents choose to have the student not participate.").
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the realm of the Pledge of Allegiance and in other aspects of public educa-
tion, that give sole choice to parents ultimately supports the choice in Fra-
zier as legitimate on the part of both parents and the State. 186 Further, while
some of the available alternatives would serve to remove the specific con-
flict between the rights of children and those of their parents, they could
also potentially undermine the right of the parent on its own by essentially
placing the parent and child at equal status level. When states place the
choice solely in the hands of the parents, they are in a sense affirming, at an
official, legal level, the parents' right to make that decision regarding their
own children.
C. Impact of the Minor's Age in the Frazier Situation
The court in Frazier only decided the facial constitutionality of the
Florida statute, and it even stressed that it "decide[d] and hint[ed] at noth-
ing about the Pledge Statute's constitutionality as applied to a specific stu-
dent or a specific division of students."'187 The court's emphasis on the fact
that it decided only the facial constitutionality, and not the as-applied con-
stitutionality, offers the possibility that the court viewed age as a pertinent
factor for who should have the right to decide the student's speech. The
implication of that emphasis could be that the court would have held differ-
ently if the statute were evaluated solely in terms of its application to Fra-
zier, a high-school junior, or even to a "division" of students in that upper
age range. The inevitable shift in a child's mental and judgment capabilities
through adolescence could support a different standard for the comparison
of rights when dealing with teenagers as opposed to younger children, but
that view creates unnecessary complications and difficulties.
Resources for decision-making, both internal and external, increase
tremendously as children grow older.188 As children become teenagers and
approach adulthood, their physical, mental, emotional, and legal status
more closely resembles that of an adult. 189 However, that similarity is not
enough to simply grant them full rights of adulthood. Our society has
placed the age of "adulthood" at eighteen years. While that threshold could
potentially be challenged as arbitrary, or no longer accurate with regards to
modem adolescent development, it nonetheless remains in place. Some
186. See, e.g., Tex. Educ. Code § 25.0820(c) (2007) (excusing student from Pledge upon written
request from parent); Cal Ed Code § 49091.10 (2007) (giving parent the right to view all curricula and
instruction); ORS § 336.035 (2007) (giving parent right to request child be excused from any class
within certain supplemental courses).
187. Frazier, 535 F.3dat 1286.
188. Harry Brighouse, How Should Children be Heard?, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 691, 702 (2003).
189. Id.
[Vol 85:2
THE POWER OF THE PARENTAL TRUMP CARD
teens possess the mental and emotional judgment of adulthood before the
age of eighteen; on the other hand, some adults of thirty-odd years have not
yet reached that full maturity. Additionally, as the Court recognized in
Yoder, adolescence is a period during which children are formed into adults
and the parental role in refining the values they have passed on throughout
their children's initial years remains crucial. 190
While there are always exceptions to the general rule, the government
has an obligation to set the age of majority at an age where it is "reasonable
to expect most people to approximate the relevant competences." 191 Some
individuals will always fall outside those assumptions, but the State does
not have the capability, in terms of either efficiency or judgment, to deal
with each individual on a case-by-case basis. 192 Consequently, a generally
applicable rule regarding ascension to adulthood and the rights thereof is
both logical and just. Further, even if the State had the resources to make
such individual determinations, doing so would undermine overall parental
authority as children would constantly challenge it, instead of restricting
such challenges to the extraordinary circumstances in which a child seeks
emancipation.
III. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR PARENTAL RIGHTS
In addition to the precedent of the Supreme Court, historical precedent
shows that children's rights to self-determination are nearly always subor-
dinate to the control of their parents. 193 While the Founders of the United
States never enumerated "parental" or "children's" rights, it was not be-
cause they saw no value in them, but simply because they were operating
within a different paradigm of articulation. 194 The Founders considered
"Americans' 'domestic habits' as necessary 'preconditions for maintaining
the constitutional Republic.""' 195 Within those domestic habits were "tradi-
tions of protecting and preparing children for citizenship, and of parental
authority and family integrity."' 196 The Founders did not enumerate those
traditions as rights; they were instead considered "cornerstones of lib-
erty." 197
190. Yoder, 406U.S. at211-12.
191. Brighouse, supra note 188, at 704.
192. Id. at 703.
193. Acton, 515 U.S. at 654.
194. Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Chil-
dren, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 321, 338 (1995-96).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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Even before the foundation of the United States, beyond American Ju-
risprudence, the philosophical foundations of the Constitution support the
idea of a fundamental right in parenting. 198 One proponent of such was
John Locke, who saw two private domains: property and family. 199 He
viewed family as completely autonomous, except in the case of a legal
controversy between a husband and wife (as in divorce). 20 0 As a result, "the
family was almost hermetically autonomous from government" in the mat-
ters of procreation and the rearing of children. 201 Locke also advocated the
need for a separation of control-for the family to control the intellectual
and ethical development of children, in order that the children grow up to
be mature citizens. 202 In his estimation, such mature citizens needed to be
capable of re-establishing government when it dissolved and resisting gov-
ernment when it became arbitrary or opposed the fundamental values of
life, liberty, and estate. 203
This paradigm would actually tend to work against the establishment
of State-run education in the first place, because a child educated by the
State is more likely to learn only the point of view of that State; therefore,
the resulting adult would be less capable of resisting an arbitrary govern-
ment, or even, in fact, recognizing one. With that in mind, for public educa-
tion to be truly effective in creating mature citizens, it must involve not just
the State, but the family and the community as well. However, while Locke
speaks of resisting and replacing bad governments, active support would be
equally necessary to sustain a non-arbitrary government that protects the
values of life, liberty, and estate. For that reason, an interest in instilling
patriotism is valid for both the family and the State. The balance must re-
main, however, with ultimate control on the side of the parents; otherwise
the discernment necessary to determine whether one's government is worth
resisting or worth reinforcing will disappear.
Though the statute in Frazier could be viewed as the government's at-
tempt to coerce patriotism through the Pledge, the court illustrates that this
compulsion was actually at the request of the parents whose votes led to the
statute in question. 204 As such, although the government cannot force such
198. See Mark E. Brandon, Family at the Birth ofAmerican Constitutional Order, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1195 (1998-1999).
199. Id. at 1205.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1206.
203. Id.
204. Frazier, 535 F.3d at 1285 n.6 (stating that while the statute starts with the presumption that
parents do not object to their children reciting the Pledge, the elected Florida legislature probably
knows more about what the parents in its state would prefer; as such, parents show express intent
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affirming speech without consent of the governed,205 it can and should act
at the command of the governed. The fact that the wishes of the governed
coincide with the desires of the State, in this instance to have civil activities
such as the Pledge of Allegiance be a consistent part of its children's edu-
cation, does not undermine the original source of the desire.
It is also important to remember that the ideals supported in Frazier
are broader than just those associated with the Pledge. The general willing-
ness of the State to involve parents in the educational system, and to sup-
port the parents in such an endeavor, further establishes to the children that
the government serves at the will of the people. It thus fosters exactly the
type of civil education that Locke encouraged, which gives citizens the
foundation to ensure that the government protects the rights and liberties of
the governed.
In addition to its place in philosophy, the modern concept of a parental
right typically falls under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.206 The historical framework that brought this Amendment
into being is vital to a clear understanding of how to apply the rights it
implicates. Both the anti-slavery traditions leading up to it and the Four-
teenth Amendment itself recognized that rights of liberty and citizenship
require self-determination, which in turn requires rights to social influence
of one's family, and a community free from the State's control. 207 Slavery
included not only the fact that humans were literal property, but also the
fact that, as property, they had no opportunity for self-determination for
themselves or for their children as against other citizens, nor did they have
any control as against the State. 208
Courts have not expressly relied on this historical foundation for the
Fourteenth Amendment in dealing with Fourteenth Amendment cases,
much less in the specific realm of parental rights. 209 However, the grant of
rights previously denied to the newly-freed slaves, including the right to
choose and maintain familial bonds, offers a clear indication of the liberties
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect for former slaves
and free alike. 210 With that basis, the application of this right when parents
and children are in conflict only serves as State support for the authority of
through written objection or implicit request through their silence).
205. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
206. Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 1348, 1349 (1993-1994).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1361.
210. Id.
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parents, which in turn stabilizes the family bonds.
IV. MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL SUPPORT FOR PARENTAL RIGHTS
Historical precedent, however, only goes so far. Perhaps the theories
of John Locke, developed prior to the inception of our entire country, or
even the underpinnings of the Fourteenth Amendment put in place over a
century ago, would seem no longer applicable against the modem under-
standing of child development. There is still modem support, however, for
the validity of these. Professor Harry Brighouse maintains that even today
parents' rights must remain superior to those of children in order for par-
ents to be effective in creating the next generation.211 He develops this
view by separating children's overall rights into two separate categories:
welfare and agency.212 Welfare rights relate to one's well-being, including
sustenance, shelter, education, and healthcare. 213 In contrast, agency rights
are those of self-determination, such as the rights to vote, marry, associate
freely with others, or follow a specific religion.214 In other words, the rights
which permit one to "act on one's own judgments," 215 According to this
framework, the right to free speech is clearly an agency right: it has nothing
to do with basic food, shelter, or other physical needs that constitute the
"welfare" of the child.
The importance of this distinction would have been minor in a time
when children were, if not quite the old adage of "seen and not heard," at
least "seen, and perhaps heard, but not listened to."'216 However, with the
modem trend of both parents and courts listening to children's expressed
desires, the amount of credence given to the child's view rests greatly on
which type of interest serves as a basis to support the child's desire. 217
Child "liberationists" would deem the child's voice the sole and final au-
thority over all decisions regarding the child.218 However, if given life, this
view would severely undermine the parental right to direct the upbringing
and education of his child, both within the home and outside it.
In contrast, Brighouse proposes that while children's voices should be
listened to, in all cases where the children speak, the credence given should
211. Brighouse, supra note 188, at 695 (2003).
212. Id. at 696.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 691.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 692.
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not be authoritative, but rather consultative. 219 This is true even in situa-
tions where an adult's voice would be authoritative without question, such
as with regard to a fundamental right.220 The final authoritative voice for
the child, by contrast, rests with the adult who is "morally charged with
protecting the interests of [the child]. ' '221 However, rather than the author-
ity that an adult has over self--"unconditional license to do what [one]
wants with respect to [oneselfl"-the authority the adult has over the child
is within the context of strict rules. 222 Just as a teacher's authority must be
used in furtherance of education, and a judge's in furtherance of the law,
the authority of an adult charged with protecting the interests of the child
must, in fact, be used to discern and protect those interests. 223
This responsibility in the hands of the adult comes from the inherent
differences between children and adults that require that children have a
guardian in the first place. Namely, children are dependent on others for
their well-being, they are vulnerable to others' decisions, and they are by
their very nature only temporarily in this state. 224 This temporary status
markedly separates children from other classes which have fought for equal
rights-such as slaves and women-because children have a natural ave-
nue to exit this status, and in fact cannot avoid exiting to full adulthood and
its accompanying rights.225 Similarly, children are separate from those
other classes because their youthful nature means they lack the rational and
emotional judgment to make decisions in their own best interests-again a
state from which they have a natural exit over time. 226
The adult in charge must protect both the child's present and future in-
terests. With regard to welfare, the adult's protection has present impact in
giving the child a happy childhood, which also serves to protect the child's
future interest in a flourishing adulthood. 227 Additionally, while the child
cannot usually enforce his right to welfare (shelter, education, the care of a
loving adult), he still has the right and the State has an interest in enforcing
it,228 which it can do under the concept of parens patriae. The adult truly
looking out for the child's interest will support that right, but if he should
219. Id. at 693.
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fail, the State has an interest in holding him accountable. 229
Agency rights, in contrast, ultimately encompass the judgment of how
to act.230 In this case, granting unfettered agency rights to children, exactly
as we grant them to adults, in fact endangers "both their current welfare
and their prospective agency interests. '231 While adults have the emotional
and mental capacity to analyze various possibilities and their logical conse-
quences, methods to deal with the consequences, and the ability to seek out
advice when necessary, children are simply incapable of such judgment by
virtue of their state of childhood. 232
The emphasis on a child's voice as consultative is, on the one hand, a
limitation of it, which is justifiable because the child is often not as well-
informed, nor emotionally capable of processing all the factors.233 On the
other hand, the consultative aspect empowers the child, in that the adult
should listen to the child as part of the process of determining the child's
best interest.
Put in the context of Frazier, parents have an obligation to prepare
their child for adulthood and part of that obligation is "inculcating" him
with moral values. As such, the adult can view more aspects of the situation
over a longer time period than can the child, which makes the adult more
likely to act in the child's best interest. However, if the child expresses an
opinion one way or the other regarding recitation of the Pledge, the adult
who pays attention to both the opinion and the justification behind it can
incorporate it into the decision of whether the child recites it or not. In this
case, age will play a role as well; a five-year-old protesting is much more
likely to be simply rebelling than a teenager articulating his philosophical
problems with saying the Pledge. In the latter case, if a parent simply forces
a child to act as the parent wishes, without explanation, it would not be
acting in the child's best interest because it would imply to the child that
his opinion carries no weight whatsoever. On the other hand, if the parent
actively listens and reciprocates the communication by explaining why he
prefers that the child continue to recite the Pledge, he has shown respect for
the child's view. Through that action, he empowers the child to continue
thinking and making independent judgments, even if the child is still re-
stricted at the moment by the parent's final decision.
Outside the interaction between parent and child, of course, remains
the ever-present actor of the State. If the child's voice is merely consulta-
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THE POWER OF THE PARENTAL TRUMP CARD
tive, and the adult has final authority, when can the State intervene to trump
the authority of the parent? Professor Emily Buss argues in an article on
parental rights after Troxel v. Granville that the children themselves are
best served when the power of the State to intervene is limited to "circum-
stances where parental incompetence is most serious and demonstrable. '234
Absent such circumstances, parents are generally in the best position to
make good judgments on their children's behalf,235 both through knowing
their children and listening to their children's voices, and through maintain-
ing consistency in the children's upbringing. Furthermore, she argues that
parents who are given "near absolute control" will actually perform bet-
ter.236 This comes both from the fact that giving parents freedom will in-
crease their enjoyment of, and thus dedication to, the mission of child-
rearing, and that intrusions-even those designed to help-often serve to
undermine parental effectiveness. 237
These practical reasons support extensive parental control, which in
turn implies that the scrutiny required to limit the child's fundamental
rights is necessary to support the parental control. This in turn affirms that
the parental right is a fundamental one. But aside from the positive benefits
of parental enjoyment of, dedication to, and effectiveness at the task of
parenting, the right of the parent should be categorized as fundamental.
Regardless of the merits of the choice made, we as a society and a govern-
ment aggressively protect individuals' rights, believing that the individual's
choice is better simply as a result of it being the individual's. 238 The child's
dependency on the parent for both welfare and agency interests support the
idea that the child is, to an extent, an extension of the parent. Contrary to
minimizing the child's identity solely for the benefit of the parent's, this
idea that the child "belongs" to the parent has positive psychological value
to the child in giving him a firm sense of belonging and familial identity,
one which cannot be undermined by State action.239 The emphasis on chil-
dren's rights alone, outside this familial framework, "speak[s] only of
autonomy rather than need, especially the central need for relationships
with adults who are themselves enabled to create settings where children
can thrive. '240 Support for these relationships, as a result of supporting
parental autonomy, can only serve to fulfill both children's needs and their
234. Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights after Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SuP. CT.
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rights.
To serve the best interests of the child, the parent should listen to him
and let him act as a consultant. But as a matter of law, the parent remains
the final authority, even if, or perhaps especially if, the parent and child are
in disagreement as to the best course of action regarding the child's up-
bringing. Only then can the parent remain effective in parenting, and at the
same time can the child remain confident in his identity within the family.
CONCLUSION
Florida did not violate the Constitution when it enacted the Pledge of
Allegiance statute at issue in Frazier, but rather met the requirements of
Barnette by allowing a means of refusal. In limiting that avenue of refusal
to the parents, and not the students, the State did not infringe upon the stu-
dents' free speech rights, but chose to support the parents' right to direct
the upbringing of their children. Parents, obligated to prepare children for
adulthood, have the right to choose the specifics of how to do so without
interference from the State, except in the cases where those parents present
a clear danger to either the children or the general public interest. Desiring
their children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance falls into neither of these
categories. Further, the State's involvement in the process remains constitu-
tional, despite the fact that it would have been unconstitutional for the State
alone to require students to recite the Pledge. Instead, the State's action is
at the behest of the parents and, in light of the relationship between parents
and their children regarding self-determination choices, serves to give ac-
tive recognition to the important role that parents fulfill in raising the next
generation of citizens.
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